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It is a basic constitutional requirement that all legislation must be 
rational rather than arbitrary.[1] Generally, the rationality requirement 
states that government must be able to substantiate any legislative 
provision, and that the reasons tendered in substantiation must 
be aligned with our Constitution[2] and its underlying values; 
in the absence of such reasons, a legislative provision would be 
unconstitutional and invalid. More specifically, the rationality 
requirement requires that the rules of logic must be applied to any 
substantiation of a legislative provision. For instance, a conclusion 
that is based on a generalisation is illogical and would not pass the 
rationality requirement. 
This article considers the regulations relating to artificial fertilisation 
of persons (‘the regulations’)[3] made in terms of the National Health Act 
No. 61 of 2003.[4] I show that the regulations are premised on the notion 
that all gamete donation and all artificial fertilisation should involve 
a healthcare practitioner – in particular, a specialist in reproductive 
medicine. I call into question the rationality of this premise. I suggest 
that a more rational premise on which to build future regulations would 
be to recognise that certain kinds of gamete donation and certain 
kinds of artificial fertilisation require the involvement of healthcare 
practitioners for good reasons; but also to recognise that other kinds 
of gamete donation and artificial fertilisation do not require the 
involvement of healthcare practitioners, and hence do not require the 
law to enforce such involvement. 
Hypothetical case study
In the following hypothetical case study, a lesbian couple, A and B, 
wish to have a child. They decide that B should become pregnant with 
the sperm of C, A’s twin brother. C agrees to provide his sperm. They 
agree that the child will be in the care and under the guardianship of 
A and B, and that C will enjoy contact rights with the child and will 
be the child’s godfather. They Google ‘how to inseminate at home’, 
quickly get an answer (in brief, masturbation followed by insertion 
of the semen by syringe), and follow the steps. B becomes pregnant, 
and after 9 months gives birth to a healthy baby girl, D. On A and 
B’s request, both A and B are indicated as D’s parents on her birth 
certificate.[5] Although one’s moral intuition would suggest that A, B 
and C have done nothing wrong – they were living their lives and did 
not harm anyone – the regulations in their current form criminalise 
their actions. 
The regulations 
The regulations’ definition of artificial fertilisation reads as follows 
(reg. 1): 
‘Artificial fertilisation’ means the introduction other than [by] 
natural means of a male gamete or gametes into the internal 
reproductive organs of a female person for the purpose of human 
reproduction and includes artificial insemination, in vitro fertilisation, 
gamete intrafallopian tube transfer, embryo intrafallopian transfer or 
intracytoplasmic sperm injection’.
Key to understanding the provisions of the regulations is the 
definition of a ‘competent person’, which reads as follows (reg. 1): 
‘‘competent person’ means a medical practitioner registered with 
the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) with expertise 
in specialist gynaecologist [sic] and sub-specialist in Reproductive 
Medicine, or a trainee in Reproductive Medicine in a training unit under 
the supervision of a registered HPCSA sub-specialist’. 
All the kinds of artificial fertilisation must be effected by a 
‘competent person’ (reg. 10(2)): ‘Only a competent person may effect 
artificial fertilisation’. Accordingly, it is clear that A, B, and C’s actions 
are in contravention of the regulations. This is not a trivial matter, 
given that contravention of the regulations is criminalised (reg. 21): 
‘Any person who contravenes or fails to comply with any provision 
of these regulations commits an offence and is liable on conviction to 
a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years, or to both 
such fine and imprisonment’.
B (who was artificially fertilised) can be prosecuted as perpetrator, 
and A (B’s partner, who involved her brother, C) and C (the sperm 
donor) can be prosecuted at least as accomplices, given that they 
actively assisted B, the perpetrator. 
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This is not the only crime for which A, B, and C can be prosecuted. The 
regulations also stipulate that a ‘competent person’ must be involved 
in the sperm donation (reg. 4(1)): 
‘No person, except a competent person, may remove or withdraw 
a gamete or cause a gamete to be removed or withdrawn, from the 
body of a gamete donor for the purpose of artificial fertilisation’. 
The terminology ‘removed or withdrawn’ is not only applicable to 
an egg donor, but to any gamete donor in general. This is made clear 
by the definition of ‘gamete donor’ that employs this terminology 
(reg. 1): 
‘‘‘Gamete donor” means a living person from whose body a gamete 
or gametes are removed or withdrawn, for the purpose of artificial 
fertilisation.’
Accordingly, given that A, B, and C all caused sperm to the donated 
without the involvement of a ‘competent person’, they are all liable to 
be prosecuted on this additional criminal charge as well. 
Involving a ‘competent person’ would only have been the first 
step towards legal compliance, as the regulations require that the 
‘competent person’ must, before donation, obtain several pieces of 
information from the donor and ensure that, among other things, 
the donor has recently undergone a test for sexually transmitted 
diseases (STDs) (reg. 8(g)). Moreover, in cases where the donor and 
the intended mother are known to each other, both parties must 
submit to psychological evaluation (reg. 8(j)). 
Discussion
Zola[6] defines ‘medicalisation’ as the ‘process whereby more and 
more of everyday life has come under medical dominion, influence 
and supervision’. I suggest that the way in which the regulations deal 
with artificial insemination (AI), with gamete donation by a known 
donor, and with sperm donation is a case of over-medicalisation. The 
problem with the regulations is that they fail to treat different kinds of 
artificial fertilisation and gamete donation differently. 
Artificial fertilisation
The definition of artificial fertilisation is broad and encompasses 
a number of techniques. These range from a technique such as 
intracytoplasmic sperm injection, that requires among other things 
an embryology laboratory and skilled embryologists, to – on the 
other side of the spectrum – AI that can be done at home,[7] as per the 
hypothetical case study. There is no reason to legally require that the 
entire spectrum of artificial fertilisation techniques be medicalised. 
A possible counter-argument may be that there is a risk that 
diseases, such as HIV, could be transmitted through AI.[8] However, the 
risk of such transmission is not sufficient reason to legally medicalise 
AI. If it were sufficient reason, unprotected consensual sexual 
intercourse should be medicalised for the same reason. The state 
surely has an interest in avoiding the transmission of disease, but it 
would be an obvious infringement on persons’ privacy to require the 
involvement of a ‘competent person’ (or any other type of healthcare 
practitioner) each time a person decides to have sexual intercourse. 
The state has other means at its disposal to promote the avoidance of 
the transmission of disease, such as awareness campaigns. The same 
rationale applies to disease in the case of AI.
Not only are privacy rights at stake, but also the right to establish 
a family (which is part of the right to human dignity),[9] and the 
right to protection against unfair discrimination. To add to the 
case study: consider a fertile heterosexual couple E and F, who are 
allowed to procreate without being legally obliged to spend time 
and money on having a ‘competent person’ involved in any way. 
Why should A, B and C be expected to expend time and money on 
such a ‘competent person’ to perform the AI if they can perform the 
procedure themselves, in the privacy and comfort of home? The 
regulations obstruct the right of persons who use AI to establish a 
family; moreover, the regulations make it more difficult for lesbian 
persons to establish a family, which constitutes unfair discrimination. 
Gamete donation
Gamete donation can be categorised along two main lines: sperm 
v. eggs, and known donor v. unknown donor. I discuss the latter 
differentiation first. In cases where an intended mother must rely on 
an unknown donor, it makes sense – in the interests of the intended 
mother – to require the donor to provide relevant information, 
including the results of relevant medical tests, to the ‘competent 
person’. Such information is a substitute for knowing the donor 
personally. However, when the donor is known to the intended 
mother, the rationale for such information in principle falls away. 
Consider, for instance, an intended mother who cannot conceive 
sexually with her husband, but who intends to use her husband’s 
sperm for in vitro fertilisation. Had she been fertile, she could have 
consented to using her husband’s sperm via sexual intercourse 
without her husband first having to provide certain information. This 
raises the issue of equal treatment of fertile and infertile persons. 
While it can be argued that having access to her husband’s STD test 
results is to the benefit of the intended mother, this is an excessively 
paternalistic way to treat consenting adults. Given that the intended 
mother knows her husband (in the sense that he is not an unknown 
anonymous donor), she can request him to undergo STD tests as a 
precondition to using his sperm – irrespective of whether the couple 
plans to procreate via sexual intercourse or via artificial means. A 
rational approach would therefore dictate that, in the case of a donor 
that is known to the intended mother, the requirement that such a 
known donor must provide certain information to the ‘competent 
person’ should be suspended. 
Instead of suspending this legal requirement, the regulations do 
the exact opposite, by in addition requiring that both the donor 
and the intended mother must submit to psychological evaluation. 
This is a clear case of over-medicalisation. With reference to the case 
study, why should A, B and C be legally required to submit to (and 
spend the time and money on) an evaluation by a psychologist, 
if E and F (a fertile heterosexual couple) are allowed to procreate 
without having to be psychologically evaluated? The fact that in 
the case of a donor that is known to the intended mother, the 
regulations still require that such a known donor must provide 
certain information to the ‘competent person’ constitutes arbitrary 
legislation and unfair discrimination against lesbian persons; the 
additional requirement of the psychological evaluation adds fuel to 
the fire of unconstitutionality.  
A further weakness of the regulations is that they fail to treat 
egg donation and sperm donation differently. While the process of 
retrieving eggs is a medical process – minor surgery – the retrieval 
of sperm for donation, by means of masturbation, is non-medical in 
nature. Accordingly, while egg donation requires the involvement of 
a relevantly qualified healthcare practitioner to effect the donation, 
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sperm donation does not require such involvement. In fact, a sperm 
donor’s right to privacy may require the opposite, namely that no 
person – including a healthcare practitioner – may be in the room 
while he is masturbating to donate sperm. There is no reason to 
legally require that sperm donation should be medicalised.
A possible counter-argument may be that the number of offspring 
from a single sperm donor should be limited, hence the need to 
involve a ‘competent person’. This counter-argument is paternalistic, as 
it assumes that sperm donors cannot abide by the law (the offspring 
limitation) by themselves, and need a healthcare practitioner to 
ensure such compliance. Such paternalism is clearly untenable in our 
constitutional dispensation that ascribes to the value of autonomy. 
The fact that the regulations make the involvement of a ‘competent 
person’ incumbent for sperm donation is again a case of over-
medicalisation. 
Conclusion
My argument should not be understood as advising against the 
involvement of a healthcare practitioner at the behest of the 
intended mother and the donor. This properly falls within the domain 
of autonomy of the intended mother and the donor. What I am 
arguing against is the over-medicalisation of artificial fertilisation 
and gamete donation – legally enforcing medical influence and 
supervision over artificial fertilisation and gamete donation without 
good (constitutionally aligned) reason. In other words, A, B and C 
should be free to make use of healthcare practitioners to assist them if 
they so choose. However, the current regime that legally forces them – 
and all persons who are similarly situated – to submit to various kinds 
of medical influence and supervision is clearly without good reason, 
and hence unconstitutional and invalid. 
In this article I have focused on the logical error of generalisation 
regarding artificial fertilisation techniques and the kinds of gamete 
donation that permeate the regulations, and the legal consequences 
such that the relevant aspects of the regulations that were discussed 
above fail the basic rationality requirement of the Constitution. I should 
note that this article is not exhaustive of all the unconstitutional and 
generally problematic aspects of the regulations. The regulations are in 
need of thorough review – especially from a constitutional perspective. 
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